Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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V 107
Type identity/Pauen: Feigl, Place, Smart: empirically determined, as between H20 and each water, clouds, ice. Not necessary because empirical. (KripkeVs). Feigl: "dual access" - token identity:> functionalism - anomalous monism (supervenience,. Davidson) - aspect dualism (actual monism) - all agree: Thesis: each mental process is identical with a neural process - therefore it must be possible in principle to investigate conditions of the first person from the perspective of the third person.
V 116
Type identity/VsType identity/Pauen: 1. It has been previously empirically impossible to determine exactly describable types of neuronal processes - 2 even in stable psychophysical correlations would an identification not make sense - why should the uniform activity of unconscious neurons be identical with consciousness ?
V 118
Token identity/Pauen: weaker version of the identity theory: it is sufficient that every mental state has some physical realization - it is no longer required, that there is a certain type of neural states, which is identical with the type of pain - "subspecies: "Abnormal monism" - functionalism.
V 158
Type identity/Pauen: today attractive again - ontological thrift - they must not insist that we mean functional relationships "in reality" when we speak of mental processes - therefore the mental state also has causality.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29