Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Turing-Test: is a proposed test by A. M. Turing (Alan M. Turing. In Computing machinery and intelligence (= 59). Mind (journal), 1950) to find out whether a machine has a way of thinking. The machine must respond to questions, requiring a more or less high degree of everyday knowledge. See also artificial intelligence, strong artificial intelligence, artificial consciousness.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
II 211
McGinnVsTuringtest: so leveling it may seem, it is a poor criterion for machine's own consciousness:
  1. It provides no necessary condition for consciousness, because many conscious beings would fail miserably in the Turing-test. (E.g. cats, which cannot speak but have a consciousness). The test is too strong linguistically oriented.
  2. The criterion is moreover not sufficient: the test is obliged to a behaviorist conception of consciousness.
II 212
Behavior/consciousness/McGinnVsBehaviorism: consciousness states cause behavior, but they are not reducible to behavior. Evidence, based on behavior, is always fallible. E.g. an actor can pretend to be in pain. In this way, behavior testifies of consciousness, but it does not guarantee it.
II 213
McGinnVsTuring-test: tries to tell when something has consciousness, without saying what consciousness is. It could be that we could build a machine that passes the test, but the darned thing would not have the slightest consciousness.
II 214
Therefore calculators are possible, they do our work without consciousness.
We could even assume that any cognitive task that we do with the help of intelligence, understanding and consciousness, could be done by a machine without intelligence, understanding and consciousness. ((s) Thus the poor behaviorism triumphs).
Each piece of rational mental activity could thus have a computational counterpart. (> Danto).
The counterpart reaches through a not mental way, what we achieve through a mental way.
II 215
If we can do in principle X without having Y, then, the fact that we can do X proofs not that we have Y.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

> Counter arguments against McGinn
> Counter arguments in relation to Turing-Test

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-26