Phylosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Token-Physicalism: within the philosophy of the mind, physicalism represents the thesis that mental processes are to be traced back to physical processes. The token-physicalism assumes that individual mental processes can be related 11 to certain individual physical processes. See also physicalism, materialism, identity theory, functionalism, eliminationism, dualism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 137
Token physicalism/Fodor:
1) weaker than materialism: Def materialism/Fodor: asserts both that the token physicalism is true and that every event falls under the laws of one or another science (so you can be token physicalist without being a materialist).
2) The token physicalism is weaker than the
Def type physicalism/Fodor: any property that is mentioned in the laws of any science, is a physical property.
Token physicalism does not include type ph, because the contingent identity of an event pair probably does not guarantee the identity of the properties whose instantiation constitutes the events, not even if the event identity is nomologically necessary.
I 138
If, on the other hand, every event is the instantiation of a property, then the type phys includes the token phys.: - two properties will be identical when they exist in the instantiation of the same property through the same individual at the same time.
3) token physicalism is weaker than the reductionism.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-27
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