Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 34
Theory does not have to be based on intention, it was internalized in the past.
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I 56
QuineVsVerification: it is pointless to equate a sentence within the theory with one outside - Inter-theoretically no meaning - no additions with "or" (>Goodman, Davidson, "fake theories") (where?).
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I 57
For the time being, we retain our beliefs in theory creation.
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I 74
Theory: Carnap: Terms - Quine: sentences.
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I 393
Theory is only predication, universal quantification, truth function (for derived properties) - general term (for primary properties) - (no "because").
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I 429
Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: behavior in every case more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore it is acceptable - but not allowed in ontology - unlike geometric object: Position of mass points made no sense - therefore not individuateable. no identity. > §52.
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I 431
Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically - like Church: "true in a higher sense" - sometimes acceptable.
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I 432
Theory: Structure of meaning, not choice of objects (Ramsey, Russell) Quine: new: even with physical objects they are also theoretical - Reason: sentences are semantically primary.
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II 45
Equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation - both true - but possibly logically incompatible.
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VI 134
Theory/Empirically equivalent/logically equivalent/Quine: Two theories can be logically incompatible and yet empirically equivalent. E.g. Riemann/Euclidean geometry - Case 1: even untransformable theories (in the same terminology, where each implies certain sentences that the other one does not imply) are empirically equivalent - no problem - Case 2: additional theoretical terms - Case 3: logically incompatible - Davidson: can be traced back to case 2 - because contentious sentences depend on theoretical terms which are not empirical - therefore they are still empirically equivalent - Solution: theoretical term in question in two spellings (according to theory) - that makes them logically compatible.
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VI 136
Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Case 2: (theory for global worlds without context embedding): - solution: eliminate exotic terms (without predictive power) - Important argument: then it is about consistency (otherwise QuineVsConsistency theory) - Elimination: justified by the fact that we have no other access to the truth except our own theory.
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VI 139
Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Variant/Davidson: Both theories are valid, truth predicate: in comprehensive, neutral language - QuineVsDavidson: how much further should the variables reach then? - We need a stop, because we do not want a third theory - "everything different"/Important argument: the two systems definitely describe the same world - purely verbal question.
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XII 70
Theory form/Quine: after abstraction of the meanings of the non-logical vocabulary and the value range of the variables - reinterpretation of the theory form provides models.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Theories



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23