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Theory/Lewis: has more theorems than follow logically from its postulate (the definition of the theoretical terms) - namely the claim that the theoretical entities are the only ones to implement the theory.
Theoretical identifications are not determined, they rather follow from the theories that they make possible.
Theory: theoretical terms: can be functionally defined, with recourse to causal roles.
Theory: In our present case, the theoretical terms are to name components of the near-implementation. (The closest implementation of the theory). We should only use the escape route of treating theoretical terms like failed descriptions when the story comes close to realization. (closest possible worlds).
We know very well that scientific theories are often almost implemented and rarely implemented.
Theory: If I am right, theoretical terms can be eliminated. We can always replace them with their definientia. This does not mean that theories are fictions or their entities are unreal. On The Contrary! Because we understand the A terms and the theoretical terms can be defined with their help, theories have a meaning without compromising. And then their entities actually exist.
These theoretical identifications are no stipulations. They are deductive conclusions.
And in this way we will conclude one day that the mental states G1, G2,... are the neural states N1, N2,....
Theory/Unambiguousness/Implementation/Lewis: a theory which claims to explain everything (e.g. a machine) cannot have a second implementation - ((s) > functionalism).
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991