|Theories: theories are statement systems for the explanation of observations, e.g. of behavior or physical, chemical or biological processes. When setting up theories, a subject domain, a vocabulary of the terms to be used and admissible methods of observation are defined. In addition to explanations, the goal of the theory formation is the predictability and comparability of observations. See also systems, models, experiments, observation, observation language, theoretical terms, theoretical entities, predictions, analogies, comparisons, evidence, verification, reduction, definitions, definability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Theory/Duhem: is an abstract system for summing and logical classification of a set of experimental laws. - Does not explain the laws.
Theory is an organization of our knowledge - Theories/Cartwright: are abound - their explanations are not all needed.
Theory/Cartwright: Prediction: lies in the fundamental laws. - Contents: lies in the phenomenological laws.
Theory Entry: preliminary state: "unprepared description": left of the as-if-operator - 1st order prepared description: requires equation. - 2nd order: Investigation of the prepared description with principles. - E.g. a laser can be described quite differently. (With or without memory). - According to the decision, there are bridge principles that say which equations are to be applied.
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Hacking I 362
Theory/Cartwright: includes no truth itself. - If truth, then by approximations!_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996