|Terminologies: here, special features of the language use of the individual authors are explained._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Schmidentical/Schidentity: Artificial identity between the subject and itself. Kripke: that is quite alright and useful.
Wolf 232F II
Russell Language/Kripke: weak: like English, only truth conditions by Russell: the present king of France must exist in order for the sentence "The present king of France is bald" to be true. - Medium: descriptions have Russell’s deep structure: there is exactly one... - strong: no descriptions, only there is exactly one... - champagne e.g.: weak and medium: here the speaker thinks (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are satisfied - strong: here the use could become the rule, because the definite article is prohibited - since the phenomenon occurs in all three languages, there can be no argument that English is not a Russell language.
Newen/Schrenk I 97
Russell Language/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: contains only the attributive reading. (~ Homophone truth conditions).
- Contrast: D Language/Kripke: includes referential and attributive reading.- KripkeVsDonnellan: e.g. "her husband is kind to her": here you need the referential and the attributive reading at the same time (not alternating). - "He is nice, but he is not her husband"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984