Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Terminologies: here, special features of the language use of the individual authors are explained.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data

Grover, D. L. on Terminology - Dictionary of Arguments

Horwich I 323
Propositional Quantification/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB: problem: because "T" is a predicate (if it is read as "is true") and "Tp" is a sentence, "p" must be a term of the language, that means, it must occupy a nominal position. That, in turn, means that the quantifiers bind individual variables (of a certain type), and not variables via sentences.
I 324
Problem: these are no longer the Ramsey variables. Ramsey variables are the ones that bind variables that occupy sentence positions. Sellars: this is right: relative pronouns can represent formulas with bound individual variables but not with propositional variables, because they have a sentence position. Solution: we need cross-reference. Cross-reference: cross-reference is made of a variable. The variable must be able to occupy the sentence position. -> Pronoun -> "Pro-verb": e.g. "do".
I 331
"Generic"/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/(s): here: "generic" is dependent on the antecedent.
I 332
"Thatt"/CGB: "thatt" is not a new term. It is only new grammar: e.g. Mary says: "It is hot". John says: "Thatt". There are no new feature ascribing predicates.
I 334
English* (with asterisk): English* is used without a truth predicate, but with the Prosentence "It is true". "Is" cannot be modified (time, etc.), because the Prosentence cannot be split. Solution: e.g. "It-is-going-to-be-true" etc. Hyphen: the hyphen shows that the truth predicate in English* cannot be isolated. N.B.: English can be translated into English* without any sacrifices - that is enlightening.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Grover, D. L.

Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992

D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap
Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975)

See external reference in the individual contributions.
Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-08-03
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