Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Subordinate clause, philosophy: Subordinate clauses lack the property of complete statement sentences to be true or false. They can be classified according to whether they correspond to general or singular terms, by contributing to a specification of the objects to which the sentence refers to and to which they belong as subsets. See also truth values, interpretation, relative clauses, conditionals, premises.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Dummett III 7
Subsentence/Indirect Speech/Question: here, singular terms do not stand for the object, but for its sense - only case in which a (sub-)sentence stands for the proposition. - Tradition: subsentences are not truth-functional. - FregeVs.
- - -
Frege II 54
Description/Subordinate Clause: discoverer of the planetary orbits = object: Kepler. - (Meaning (reference): No truth value. - The meaning of the subordinate clause is not a complete thought (It cannot be the main clause).
II 62
Subordinate Clause/Subsentence/Meaning/Truth Value/tr.val./Frege: E.g. Bebel beleived that the return of Alsace-Lorraine will appease the feeling of vengeance of France. - Here, two ideas are implicit: 1) That Bebel believes that. - 2) That it is wrong - first meaning: a thought. - Second meaning: a truth value -Therefore, the subordinate clause is actually to be taken twice. - Since the truth value is not the whole meaning, we cannot just replace it. - Similar: E.g. knowledge, recognition, "it is known".
II 63
Subordinate Clauses/Subordinate Clause/Frege: E.g. false belief implies two meanings: a thought and a truth value. - Similar: propositional attitudes.
- - -
IV 69
Description/Subordinate Clause/Subsentence/Name/Frege: E.g. "The negation of the idea that 3 is greater than 5". - Here, this term refers to a specific individual thing. - This individual thing is a thought - the definite article turns the whole expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-06-25
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