Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Partial identity: Partial identity in philosophy or logic describes the relationship between objects that have certain properties or parts in common but are not completely identical. It emphasizes the overlapping of characteristics without implying complete equality and is often studied in set theory or relational concepts. See also identity, similarity, logic, set theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David M. Armstrong on Partial Identity - Dictionary of Arguments
II (c) 98f Partial identity/Armstrong: non-mereologically: complex property and relation can be in a whole-part-relation or be overlapping, but not mereologically. - E.g.. the property of having 5 kg weight: then the particular is among other things, composed of several non-overlapping parts, each of which has a 3 kg and the other 2 kg mass. - Here >universals seem correct. - A case of partial identity. Cf. >Identity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Partial Identity
