Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Tautology, philosophy: A tautology is a statement that is constructed in such a way that it cannot be wrong, because its elements are repeated either affirmatively or negatively, or an exhaustive enumeration of possibilities is spread between which no decision is made. For example, A = A; If A, then A; A or non-A. Tautologies are not informative. See also certainty, information, knowledge, logic, validity, universality, contradiction, truth values, interpretation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Tautologies - Dictionary of Arguments
V 190/91 Tautology: SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are not empty: e.g. "either he is fascist or he is not a fascist" is very different from "either he is a hairdresser or he is not a hairdresser". V 161 Universals/Searle: theoretically, a universal can be derived from any tautology: "bald or not bald". Vs: if one wanted to infer the existence of redness from the tautology "everything is either red or not red", this would only be a misunderstanding. With tautologies, no extra-linguistic facts are assumed. >Universals. V 176 Existence/language/universalia/SearleVsTradition: but the assertion that any non-linguistic entities exist can never be a tautology._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Tautologies
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19