Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Deception, philosophy: A deception is an idea that diverges from what would have been expected by the way in which this idea was caused, when the expectation or expectability is based on past experience or shared experiences and expectations of a community of subjects. See also error, causal theory of knowledge, reliability theory, knowledge, certainty, objectivity, intersubjectivity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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St. Schiffer on Deceptions - Dictionary of Arguments
Avr I 57 Deception/HarmanVsGrice: we might need self-referential facts ((s) these are certainly true, because they are about themselves). Problem: 1) why not from the start? 2) If not possible, then the whole analysis gets problematic. Solution/Harman: the speaker intends that the hearer responds for the proper reason: recognizing the speaker’s intention. >Speaker intention, >Paul Grice. Schiffer/Grice: Grice wants to avoid self-referring facts. Problem: the resulting complexity. >Self-reference, >Facts, >Complexity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Deceptions
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19