|Deception, philosophy: A deception is an idea that diverges from what would have been expected by the way in which this idea was caused, when the expectation or expectability is based on past experience or shared experiences and expectations of a community of subjects. See also error, causal theory of knowledge, reliability theory, knowledge, certainty, objectivity, intersubjectivity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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|Meg I 281ff
Lying/Deception/Hungerland: One must assert something in order to lie.
I 300 f
Strawson: Deception/lie: the exception to the rule. - HungerlandVsStrawson: Deception just before right background.
Avramides I 52
Deception/Grice: additional condition: 2) There must be no inference element E such that S utters x by intendeding both: - a) that A s determination of the reaction r is based on E and - b) that A thinks S intends that a) is false - This is to prevent fraudulent intent.
SchifferVs fails with the original counter e.g. - Solution/Schiffer: mutual knowledge ad infinitum. - Knowing that knowledge of a certain property is sufficient for the knowledge of a proposition. - Then we also know that knowledge is sufficient. Avramides: E.g. - being F, being G: intact sensory organs in speaker/listener._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
H. Paul Grice
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Hg. Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1993
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989