Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Deception, philosophy: A deception is an idea that diverges from what would have been expected by the way in which this idea was caused, when the expectation or expectability is based on past experience or shared experiences and expectations of a community of subjects. See also error, causal theory of knowledge, reliability theory, knowledge, certainty, objectivity, intersubjectivity.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 214
Bluff/Davidson/Rorty: bring us through a causal process to represent true or false beliefs depending on the programming.
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Dav I 38
Error/belief/Davidson: that I do not deceive myself in the majority of cases is essential for the fact that I have a language - that makes "inner objects" superfluous - instead: history of language acquisition - truth conditions for the speaker: sentence is true when e.g. the Kohinoor is a crown jewel - ((s) conditional: non-empiric - for the listener: empiric.)
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I 98
Third dogma/schema/content/error/deception/Davidson: deception after abolition of the separation schema/content no longer a problem, no question whether we are capable of the knowledge of the world and of the foreign-psychological - even more: how - but these are no longer epistemological questions, but rather questions about the nature of rationality.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-29