Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Rorty VI 214
Bluff/Davidson/Rorty: bring us through a causal process to represent true or false beliefs depending on the programming.
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Dav I 38
Error/belief/Davidson: that I do not deceive myself in the majority of cases is essential for the fact that I have a language - that makes "inner objects" superfluous - instead: history of language acquisition - truth conditions for the speaker: sentence is true when e.g. the Kohinoor is a crown jewel - ((s) conditional: non-empiric - for the listener: empiric.)
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I 98
Third dogma/schema/content/error/deception/Davidson: deception after abolition of the separation schema/content no longer a problem, no question whether we are capable of the knowledge of the world and of the foreign-psychological - even more: how - but these are no longer epistemological questions, but rather questions about the nature of rationality.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29