Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Facts, philosophy: facts are that which corresponds to a true statement or - according to some authors - is identical with a true statement. Problems result from possible multiple counting of objects, e.g. when it is spoken of a situation and additionally by the fact that this situation exists. Therefore, some authors consider the assumption of facts as something superfluous. See also truths of reason, factual truths, facts, truth, statements, knowledge, certainty, thought objects.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
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Horwich I 189
Facts/StrawsonVsAustin: Incorrect alignment of facts and things.
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Horwich I 190
Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: should go beyond the "beyond" of the statement. - But there is nothing. - This comes from Austin's need for a "truth maker".
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I 191
The fact that the cat is sick, is not made true by the cat, but at most by the fact that is expressed by the sentence. - Reference/Strawson: a statement: is the material corollary, not its fact. - I can possibly measure the corollary with the clock, issue etc. - Fact: pseudo-material correlate of the entire statement. - Fact: not a thing, not even a composite object.
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I 192
It is what the statement notes, not what it is. - Facts are not "beyond".
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I 193
Facts and statements are in accordance with each other, they are made for each other, if one eliminates one, then also the other. But the world will not be poorer through that.
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Seel2 III 104f
Fact/Strawson/Seel: if we call something a fact, we think it is real like the sentence says it. - A fact is nothing more than the contents of a true belief - the alleged facts are not even from this the world.
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III 104/105
In contrast to actual processes facts are abstract objects - they relate to a real state, without being themselves an occurrence in the world. - E.g. the fact that Napoleon won the battle, is not the same as the battle - the images do not correspond with beings in the world.
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Strawson II 20
Facts cannot burn, they do not wither - (timeless).
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II 250
Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: equating fact and thing leads to equating of saying-something and relate-to-something. - Statement and sentence must not be equated.
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II 253
Fact/thing/StrawsonVsAustin/StrawsonVsSpeech Act Theory: completely different types. - Fact: what is said. - Thing: about what something is said - VsAustin: believes, a statement would be something in the world - Confusion with the event of utterance (speech act).
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II 254
Of course facts and statements correspond, they are made for each other - Facts, fact and situations are not seen but rather recorded or summarized.
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II 255
E.g. being worried by facts, is not the same as being worried by a shadow. - He is worried because... .
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II 259
Fact: already implies a discourse context - but we do not talk about this framework, also not with terms such as statement and true.
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IV 150/51
Fact/Strawson: something to determine, nothing to be described. - There are always different descriptions possible.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


> Counter arguments against Strawson
> Counter arguments in relation to Facts



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-22