Dictionary of Arguments

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Facts, philosophy: facts are that which corresponds to a true statement or - according to some authors - is identical with a true statement. Problems result from possible multiple counting of objects, e.g. when it is spoken of a situation and additionally by the fact that this situation exists. Therefore, some authors consider the assumption of facts as something superfluous. See also truths of reason, factual truths, facts, truth, statements, knowledge, certainty, thought objects.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 28
Definition minimal fact: facts about which can be reported reliable, because here errors are less likely. The fact that the tie seems to be on a certain occasion green. (SellarsVs).
With seeing, one provides more than a description of the experience. One affirms a claim.
I 44
Fact: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.)
But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing.
Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience.
II 315/16
Subject: is named and not uttered - fact: is uttered and not named. (Although the name of an utterance can be made).
II 320
SellarsVsWittgenstein: we must avoid to join his equating of complex objects with facts.
The claim that the complex object K, wold be the fact aRb is logical nonsense.
Fact: you can say in two different ways something "about a fact":
a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact".
b) it contains a fact expression, that means the name of a fact rather than a statement.
II 323
Natural-linguistic objects: (> Searles background): Solution: natural-language objects are seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!). One can speak of them as "proper names". That coincides with Wittgenstein's view that elementary statements must be constructed as proper names occurring in a particular way.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-21
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