Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Facts, philosophy: facts are that which corresponds to a true statement or - according to some authors - is identical with a true statement. Problems result from possible multiple counting of objects, e.g. when it is spoken of a situation and additionally by the fact that this situation exists. Therefore, some authors consider the assumption of facts as something superfluous. See also truths of reason, factual truths, facts, truth, statements, knowledge, certainty, thought objects.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Books on Amazon
III 44ff
Institutional facts/Searle: E.g. money, elections, universities, chess, etc. First, there must be something physical.
Fact/Searle: something outside the statement that makes it true - a condition - fact/Austin/Strawson: what is said, not something what is testified about.
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III 212
Fact/Searle: general name for the conditions how sentences relate to ... something.
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III 219
Strawson: facts are no complex things or groups of things - fact and statement are not two independent entities - facts are not language independent - facts are not what statements are "about" - Frege: fact = true statement - (StrawsonVs, AustinVs) - Strawson: they are not identical, because they play different roles: facts are causal statements, not statements.
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III 214
Facts are "internal accusative" for true statements- (spurious relation).
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III 219
Fact/Searle: can only be formulated but not named.
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III 215
Searle: facts are not true statements. Fact has causal relation - several statements possible for a fact.
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III 219
Fact/Searle: something outside the statement that makes it true - a condition.
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III 219 ~
Fact/Strawson: that what is said, not something that is testified about. (like Brandom) - SearleVsStrawson: fact is not a true statement. Fact has causal relation - several statements possible for a fact (like Austin).
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V 145
Fact/Searle: no fact about objects - objects cannot be named without facts - (VsWittgenstein, Tractatus) - quantification via objects is misleading - better: "there are examples".


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-11-20