Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Rorty I 217
Fact/Quine/Rorty: "Dog" is the English word for "dog", and "Robinson believes in God": that is not a truth type that expresses a "fact", something "factual".
Quine thus offers us a distinction between truth by virtue of convergence truth by virtue of correspondence instead of the positivist distinction between conventional and empirically confirmed truth.
Davidson.... Quinesian resolution of the distinction between questions of meaning and questions of fact.
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Quine I 426f
Facts/Quine: not something mediating according to the image of our sentences (VsSellars, VsWittgenstein?) - better: true sentence or true proposition - facts not are required, especially not in addition to propositions.
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II 37
Another term I want to save from the abyss of the transcendental is the term factual which proves to be relevant in the theory of radical translation. In this case, none of the facts decides which of the two manuals is right. And this term of the factual is neither transcendental nor epistemological to such an extent ((s) no fact can decide - requires facts that are just not fit to do so.) ++
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II 37
Actual: radical translation: no fact decides which of the manuals is right - Actual things are ontological, naturalistic - neither transcendental nor epistemological - physical conditions, not empirical skills - reinterpretation only with others, not with ourselves. - Factuality as gravity, inherent in our nature.
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VI 113
Fact/Quine: we can erase that. - "It is a fact" does not contribute anything. - It is only seemingly founded in correspondence theory. - A true sentence as a whole corresponds to a fact. - "It is true that" is necessary for sentences that do not exist.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


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> Counter arguments in relation to Facts



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26