|Facts, philosophy: facts are that which corresponds to a true statement or - according to some authors - is identical with a true statement. Problems result from possible multiple counting of objects, e.g. when it is spoken of a situation and additionally by the fact that this situation exists. Therefore, some authors consider the assumption of facts as something superfluous. See also truths of reason, factual truths, facts, truth, statements, knowledge, certainty, thought objects._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
Books on Amazon
|Rorty I 217
Fact/Quine/Rorty: "Dog" is the English word for "dog", and "Robinson believes in God": that is not a truth type that expresses a "fact", something "factual".
Quine thus offers us a distinction between truth by virtue of convergence truth by virtue of correspondence instead of the positivist distinction between conventional and empirically confirmed truth.
Davidson.... Quinesian resolution of the distinction between questions of meaning and questions of fact.
Quine I 426f
Facts/Quine: not something mediating according to the image of our sentences (VsSellars, VsWittgenstein?) - better: true sentence or true proposition - facts not are required, especially not in addition to propositions.
Another term I want to save from the abyss of the transcendental is the term factual which proves to be relevant in the theory of radical translation. In this case, none of the facts decides which of the two manuals is right. And this term of the factual is neither transcendental nor epistemological to such an extent ((s) no fact can decide - requires facts that are just not fit to do so.) ++
Actual: radical translation: no fact decides which of the manuals is right - Actual things are ontological, naturalistic - neither transcendental nor epistemological - physical conditions, not empirical skills - reinterpretation only with others, not with ourselves. - Factuality as gravity, inherent in our nature.
Fact/Quine: we can erase that. - "It is a fact" does not contribute anything. - It is only seemingly founded in correspondence theory. - A true sentence as a whole corresponds to a fact. - "It is true that" is necessary for sentences that do not exist._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000