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Facts/Goodman: are small theories and true theories are huge facts.
Convention/fact/Goodman: When the question of the composition of dots is conventional, and not a question of facts, then points and lines are not less conventional in any case. (There is no neutral fact).
E.g. Does the moon rotate or does it not rotate?
When I say that different sides of the moon are facing the sun at different times, then this is not a statement about motion, halt, rotation. Movement disappears from the sphere of facts. We produce rotation or halt of the moon.
All facts threaten to dissolve into convention, all nature in artifices.
The statements about the moon are alternatives. But these objects, observations, measurements, principles are themselves conventional: These facts are creatures of their descriptions (> fact). Two versions are about "the same facts" in the extent to which they have some expressions in common. Each convention depends on the fact, but every fact is convention.
Distinction between convention and fact is itself conventional.
Henry James on what is real: A fact is something that does not want to give way, that we cannot not know.
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989