Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Facts, philosophy: facts are that which corresponds to a true statement or - according to some authors - is identical with a true statement. Problems result from possible multiple counting of objects, e.g. when it is spoken of a situation and additionally by the fact that this situation exists. Therefore, some authors consider the assumption of facts as something superfluous. See also truths of reason, factual truths, facts, truth, statements, knowledge, certainty, thought objects.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
II 126
Inflationism/Field: proceeds from facts (unlike the deflationism). - Especially facts about the use of a language. - FieldVs: what kind of facts are this supposed to be?
Deflationism: the homophony condition is sufficient to rule out the fact that we do not use a language with deviating reference - there are no other facts. ((s) Homophony: "Snow is white" is true "iff snow is white).
I 183
Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: E.g. relativistic mass or own-masse in the special relativity theory: no fact decides which hypothesis is to be assumed. - The laws are, however, in some cases easier formulated, depending on the choice.
II 224
Fact/discourse without facts/Nonfactualism/Field: 1. Questions of vagueness (Sorites): E.g. there is no fact, on which "bald" accurately refers
2. Assessment questions/Morality/Ethics
3. sentences with indicators/index words
4. subjunctive conditionals/contrafactual conditionals.
II 265
"No fact"/Nonfactualism/Field: in pure mathematics, the problem of finding facts about our use of concepts is insoluble.
III 362
Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: it is clear that there is no fact about whether Zermelo's or von Neumann's approach "presents" the things "correctly", there is no fact which decides whether numbers are sets.
II 373
Belief/Justification/Field: It is pointless to ask whether logical beliefs are dependent on logical facts.
II 381
Fact/Condition/Field: instead of a fact there may be e.g. a condition - E.g. preservation of truth.
III 50
Geometry/real facts/Field: (via Euclidean space) are about betweenness and congruence - as in the axioms of Hilbert.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-25