Dictionary of Arguments

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Facts, philosophy: facts are that which corresponds to a true statement or - according to some authors - is identical with a true statement. Problems result from possible multiple counting of objects, e.g. when it is spoken of a situation and additionally by the fact that this situation exists. Therefore, some authors consider the assumption of facts as something superfluous. See also truths of reason, factual truths, facts, truth, statements, knowledge, certainty, thought objects.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
III 144 f
Negative Facts/Negative States: harmless: if certain speed, then no other speed at the same time - but already implied -> derived laws - III 147 better neg prop than neg laws: otherwise laws not instantiated - neg facts: have a neg prop - But only as caused, not causal -> derived laws.
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II (d) 149
General Fact(s)/Russell/Armstrong: All quantification needs "general facts" as true makers -(Armstrong pro) - Armstrong: i.e. also a Regth needs general facts - Martin: nothing in the concept of "gen facts" helps to distinguish real laws from mere GF - Armstrong: dito - Gen Facts/Armstrong: do not involve universals either - we have to go behind the general facts, since they do not involve a direct connection of types - II 150 Lewis: if they are approved, they regulate the world by prohibiting certain additional states.
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Martin III 175
"General Fact"/Russell/Martin: no law, mere conjunction, aggregate, etc. But: Point: Unexceptionality: can also be general fact (still not a law)
Martin III 181
General Fact/Entirety: Martin: Problem: negative facts - solution/Martin: the general term "what-and-how-something-exists" is of the first level ((s) not a summary of lower level entities) - "what exists" has subdivisions on the same level - subdivisions should have the same level as the entirety - then no need for a "general fact" (f.o.th. order, level)


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-16
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