Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Rorty I 38ff
WrightVsTarski: he did not succeed to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessary also a striving for the other, but a success in one is not necessarily a success with the other.
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Wright I 85
VsWright: Tarski requires bivalence, assertions can also be undecidable (Vs Platitude assertion = putting something forward as true) - WrightVsVs: the deflationismus precisely does not accept the (disquotation scheme) - there are no problems with indefinite truth values, but with additional ones or gaps.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


> Counter arguments against Wright
> Counter arguments in relation to Tarski



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23