Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Rorty VI 32
Davidson/Rorty: Tarskis "true in -L" specifies extension and thus no reference to future or general cases.
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Rorty VI 123 ff
T-Theory/Davidson/Rorty: "Theory of truth for a Language: simple "a theory that makes it possible to predict with some success what noise a speaker will make in what situation.
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Rorty VI 193
Rorty: Fact/Davidson/Rorty: Tarski's great merit is it, to have shown that we can do without the concept of fact.
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K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 50f
Meaning/Tarski/Davidson: Tarski-like theories do not refer to meaning as fixed entities. (Davidson pro: meaning ultimately not fixable) - Consequences: 1. DavidsonVsTarski: actually spoken language ultimately irrelevant - 2. The trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993


> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Tarski



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-19