|Symbols: The concept of a symbol has, in a broader sense, the same meaning as the concept of a sign. The special use of the concept in different authors differs in some respects fundamentally, for example, with regard to which role conventions play in the formation of symbols and whether symbols form a system. See also signs, icons, conventions, meaning, reference, picture theory, representation, substitution, code._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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|Hintikka I 60f
Symbol/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: symbols are not what they appear to be: R looks like a noun, but is not a noun - what is symbolized is that R occurs between a and b.
So R is not the indefinable symbol in aRb. (Aül 9) - Hintikka: but the indefinable symbols are for Wittgenstein nothing more than names and these stand for objects - but the name is not a linguistic symbol (the letter R) but a linguistic relation, namely, to occur next to a specific letter - But different than Frege's distinction saturated/unsaturated.
Symbol/Wittgenstein - is complete in itself - it does not refer to something outside._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996