Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Supervenience, philosophy of mind: supervenience is an expression for a restricted dependency between areas. Elements of a region B are dependent on changes of elements of an area A, but not vice versa. Supervenience is used by some authors to explain the relationship between mental and physical processes. The assumption of a supervenience serves to circumvent more powerful assumptions like, e.g. the identity theory. See also covariance, dependency, identity theory, materialism, reductionism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 146
Supervenience original ethics: moral property supposedly opposite natural properties (Moore) - there must be a feature, why something is better, but not causation but constitution by this feature.
Causation or constitution: Description - supervenience - related structure: sufficient/necessary: supervenience.
Supervenience: a) mind completely dependent on physique - b) Physical equality guarantees mental equality, but not vice versa.
Mind-Body Problem/Searle: only causality important: micro (physique) causes macro (mind) (from bottom to top) - SearleVsSupervenience: thereby superfluous - strength is causally supervenient in contrast to given molecular structure, but thereby not epiphenomenal.
Graeser I 160
Supervenience/Searle/Graeser: corresponds with sufficient but not with necessary conditions - Davidson: sets: A predicate P is supervenient in relation to a set of predicates S iff P differentiates no entities, which cannot be distinguished by S as well.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Supervenience

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-25