Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Supervenience, philosophy of mind: supervenience is an expression for a restricted dependency between areas. Elements of a region B are dependent on changes of elements of an area A, but not vice versa. Supervenience is used by some authors to explain the relationship between mental and physical processes. The assumption of a supervenience serves to circumvent more powerful assumptions like, e.g. the identity theory. See also covariance, dependency, identity theory, materialism, reductionism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Supervenience - Dictionary of Arguments
I 146 Supervenience/Searle: the concept of supervenience stems from ethics: moral property sits supposedly opposite of natural properties (Moore). There must be a feature, why something is better, but not causation but constitution by this feature. >Causation, >Constitution. Supervenience: a) mind completely dependent on physique - b) physical equality guarantees mental equality, but not vice versa. Mind-Body Problem/Searle: only causality is important: micro (physique) causes macro (mind) (from bottom to top, bottom-up). >Mind/Body-problem. SearleVsSupervenience: supervenience is thereby superfluous. Strength is causally supervenient in contrast to the given molecular structure, but thereby not epiphenomenal. >Epiphenomenalism. - - - Graeser I 160 Supervenience/Searle/Graeser: supervenience corresponds with sufficient but not with necessary conditions. >Sufficiency. Davidson: sets: a predicate P is supervenient in relation to a set of predicates S iff P differentiates no entities, which cannot be distinguished by S as well._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Supervenience
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19