Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 68
Consciousness/Supervenience/McGinnVsSearle: conscious states do not allow an emergence theoretical explanation using mereological terms. We are unable, to trace back pain to underlying neural entities.
I 68
In contrast to that, it is quite possible to explain the higher level properties of liquids in this way. ((s) Because all levels are easily available to us.)
I 69
States of consciousness are therefore not to be explored according to CAlM (combinatorial atomism with lawlike mappings). We can probably grasp higher order brain functions of their constituents, but if we start from the consciousness, this explanation fails.
Therefore, we do not have a model for a possible emergence relation. We do not see an obvious consequence relation. (> Supervenience)
I 98
I/McGinn: is subject to a kind of physically induced consequence relation: are two bodies physically identical, and if one of them is a person, the other one must be a person, too.
Because in terms of person-likeness there can be no difference, which would not be based on a physical difference.

C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

> Counter arguments against McGinn
> Counter arguments in relation to Supervenience

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29