Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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II, 142ff
Supervenience/Davidson/Glüer: no difference in the one set without any difference in the other. Glüer: the mental should not be a mere epiphenomenon of the physical - all mental events are physical, but not reversed - (S1) there can be no two events , which are the same in all physical aspects but differ in a mental aspect - or: (S2) an object cannot change in a mental aspect without changing at the same time in a physical aspect - Problem: Individuation of Objects - Davidson: beliefs are not supervenient in relation to neuronal states, because they get partly individuated externalistically with respect to objects - E.g. twin earth: Brain states identical/mental states different.
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II 144
Davidson: a further conception of supervenience: "that does not mean that mental states are not supervenient in relation to physical states, for somewhere there must be a physical difference when psychological states are different." (Here, for example, water/twin earth - thus externalistic) - "global supervision". - (S3) A predicate P is supervenient in relation to a set of predicates S iff and only if P does not distinguish entities that also cannot be distinguished by S.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Supervenience



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30