Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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II, 142ff
Supervenience/Davidson/Glüer: no difference in the one set without any difference in the other. Glüer: the mental should not be a mere epiphenomenon of the physical - all mental events are physical, but not reversed - (S1) there can be no two events , which are the same in all physical aspects but differ in a mental aspect - or: (S2) an object cannot change in a mental aspect without changing at the same time in a physical aspect - Problem: Individuation of Objects - Davidson: beliefs are not supervenient in relation to neuronal states, because they get partly individuated externalistically with respect to objects - E.g. twin earth: Brain states identical/mental states different.
II 144
Davidson: a further conception of supervenience: "that does not mean that mental states are not supervenient in relation to physical states, for somewhere there must be a physical difference when psychological states are different." (Here, for example, water/twin earth - thus externalistic) - "global supervision". - (S3) A predicate P is supervenient in relation to a set of predicates S iff and only if P does not distinguish entities that also cannot be distinguished by S.

D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

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> Counter arguments in relation to Supervenience

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-30