Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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II 132
"cum" instead of supervenience - MartinVsArmstrong / VsPlace: properties are qualitative-cum-dispositional (or vice versa) - not dispositionality supervening on the categoric property and not vice versa - rather than "inert", i.e., unable to make a difference or effect to be - solution / Martin: reciprocal partners for mutual manifestation: E.g. salt dissolves in water, which both are subject to change.
II 167
Supervenience / Searle: strength supervenes causally on microstructure - no epiphenomenon - causal sufficiency of the microstructure makes the concept of supervenience superfluous - ((s) even doubling) - MartinVsSearle: how can things that are identical to parts of the whole, have a causal effect on the whole which consists of them? Absurd.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Supervenience



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29