Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Supervaluation, philosophy: The term goes back to a proposal by B. van Fraassen (“The Journal of Philosophy”, Vol. 63, No. 17, (Sept. 15, 1966), pp. 481-495). If not enough information is available for a decision, the consequences of different possible decisions are compared. Cases which each time produce the truth value t are called "super-true", corresponding for the truth value f as "super-false". One problem is the persistence of truth value gaps. See also truth value clusters, truth value gaps, valuation, evaluation, vagueness, sorites, indeterminacy, dialethism, paradoxes.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
IV 70
Supervaluation/Fraassen/Lewis: idea: when we are faced with an arbitrary decision, we do not have to make a choice, but look what is common to all choices.
V 8
Supervaluation/van Fraassen/Lewis: true, no matter what arbitrary choice between worlds is taken. - E.g. Bizet/Verdi: French and not French (and I u ~ I) both without truth value. - (F v I) and (C ~ v ~ I): super-true. - (F u I) super-wrong. Problem: truth value gaps.
Sw I 204
Supervaluation/Lewis: an utterance of a vague sentence is true iff nearly all his clarifications are true. - Problem: in borderline cases, both "it is raining" and "it is not raining" both are wrong. - But it is precisely that what avoids paradoxes.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

> Counter arguments against Lewis

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-25