Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Supervaluation, philosophy: The term goes back to a proposal by B. van Fraassen (“The Journal of Philosophy”, Vol. 63, No. 17, (Sept. 15, 1966), pp. 481-495). If not enough information is available for a decision, the consequences of different possible decisions are compared. Cases which each time produce the truth value t are called "super-true", corresponding for the truth value f as "super-false". One problem is the persistence of truth value gaps. See also truth value clusters, truth value gaps, valuation, evaluation, vagueness, sorites, indeterminacy, dialethism, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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D. Lewis on Supervaluation - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 70 Supervaluation/Fraassen/Lewis: idea: when we are faced with an arbitrary decision, we do not have to make a choice, but look what is common to all choices. --- V 8 Supervaluation/van Fraassen/Lewis: true, no matter what arbitrary choice between worlds is taken. - E.g. Bizet/Verdi: French and not French (and I u ~ I) both without truth value. - (F v I) and (C ~ v ~ I): super-true. - (F u I) super-wrong. Problem: truth value gaps. >Truth value, >Truth value gap, >Similarity metrics. --- Schwarz I 204 Supervaluation/Lewis: an utterance of a vague sentence is true iff nearly all his clarifications are true. Problem: in borderline cases, both "it is raining" and "it is not raining" both are wrong. - But it is precisely that what avoids paradoxes._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |