|Substance, philosophy: in the philosophical discussion, the substance is the assumed, not-determined, equilibrium, which is the basis of the changing forms or accidents of the objects. See also ousia, accidents, substratum._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Hintikka I 69 ff
Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: phenomenological objects (objects of immediate experience) are also included.
2.021 Objects are the substance of the world
2.024 The substance is what exists independently of what is the case.
2.0271 The object is the fixed, the existing, the configuration is the changing, the volatile.
Substance/Tractatus/Hintikka: ("Objects: substance of the world...") Important: this kind of substantiality has nothing to do with the permanence or transience of the objects in the actual course of events.
2.025 Wittgenstein claims that the objects are form and content and not only substance of the possible world, but also its form. (logical form).
When a philosopher thinks about logical form today, he probably thinks first and foremost of the possibilities of making complex sentences out of simple sentences.
I 102 ff
Substance/Object/World/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: how is it possible that objects of acquaintance to which we can only point, function as an existing, solid form of the world?
What can be less existing, firm and consistent than the sense data, which in Russell's writings are regarded as prime examples for the objects of acquaintance?
Substance/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: so the problem of substantiality remains.
Solution: a completely different kind. All talking about permanence is relative to any postulated transformation or change. What change is Wittgenstein planning? The change from one possible world to another! This has nothing to do with the durability of the objects in time.
Hintikka I 104
Substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: not because Wittgenstein's objects would be indestructible, they are substance-like but because they are the meanings of our simplest expressions. The expressions whose meanings cannot be described but only exhibited. It is logically incorrect to point to an object "this does not exists". Not because it would be indestructible. - Also not unchangeable - different: if they were composed. Therefore, the objects that make up the substance, are simple objects.
Substance/Tractatus/Schulte: the simple objects form the solid form of the world, its substance. They contain the possibility of all circumstances.
Schulte: there are three interpretations here:
1. realistic objects, "real" atoms, in turn invariable
2. objects are sensory data,
3. the nature of the objects is to be understood only in dependence on the function of the expressions denoting them.
Tetens VII 48
Definition Substance/Tractatus/Tetens: the substance of the world is the set of all logically possible worlds: ((s) So it is identical with the logical space). - Tetens: what remains the same in these worlds: the set of objects. The facts change. ((s) = configurations) - actual world: the possible world whose facts are facts. N.B.: therefore the world is the totality of facts. - Fact: possible fact._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Merrill B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994
Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009