Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Subject, philosophy: the subject is, in the most general sense, the originator of actions and creativity as well as bearer of ideas, beliefs, perceptions, feelings and moods. In the tradition of German idealism the subject is opposed to the object. More recently, there has been a shift in the focus of the discussion to questions of access to internal states. See also I, self, subjectivity, object, idealism, actions, action theory.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data

John R. Searle on Subjects - Dictionary of Arguments

V 182
Subject/predicate/SearleVsStrawson: there is a functional difference between subject and predicate: the subject identifies the object and the predicate characterizes the already identified object.
V 150
Predication/object/existence/Searle: Problem: e.g. "Sam is drunk". Question: Is there anything that corresponds to "is drunk" in the same way as Sam corresponds to "Sam"?
V 151
Frege: Yes, a term. Here, it is the term "drunkenness". Problem: this violates the Leibniz Law (interchangeability salva veritate):
Example: "Sam is drunkenness". Frege's solution: "the term horse is not a term, but an object".
Term/Frege: "term" exhibits a predicament of language. The term "term" is used in a double sense.
The term "horse" can be a grammatical subject but not a grammatical predicate of a sentence.
The quality of being a horse is not itself an attribution of a quality.
V 173
Frege did not succeed in demonstrating a symmetry of subject and predicate. ((s)> Brandom: proves necessary asymmetry). >Singular terms/Brandom.
V 174
Term Theory/Strawson/Thesis: both the subject and the predicate identify "non-linguistic entities". They introduce them into the proposition where they are linked by a "non-relational connection". (SearleVs).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-04-17
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