|Statue/Clay: This is an example for the distinguishability or indistinguishability of the properties of an object on the basis of different characterizations or descriptions of this object. Thus the material of a statue does not have the property to refer to the object represented by the statue at the same time. See also substance, substrate, properties, rigidity, change, identity, identity conditions, description levels._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Frank I 124
Identity/Body/Kripke: "A" is the (rigid) name for the body of Descartes - Descartes survived the body - that is: M (Descartes not the same as A) - this is not a modal fallacy, because A is rigid - analog: Statue does not equal molecule collection.
Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann
(eds.) (1972), 253-355
_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994