Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rigidity, philosophy: Rigidity is an expression for the property of names to stand for the same object in all possible worlds, as opposed to descriptions that are not rigid and can change their reference. E.g. it is pointless to ask whether Napoleon might have been someone else but Napoleon in a possible world, but it is not meaningless to say that there is a possible world in which Napoleon is not the winner of Austerlitz. See also descriptions, names, possible worlds, range, necessity, possibility, reference, semantics of possible worlds, intensions, propositions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Robert Stalnaker on Rigidity - Dictionary of Arguments
I 81 Non-rigidness/non-rigid/predicate/Stalnaker: non-rigid predicates correspond to different intrinsic properties in various possible worlds. >Predicates, >Possible worlds, >Intrinsicness. I 185 Rigidness/Stalnaker: does rigidness presuppose cross world identity? >Cross world identity. I 197 Dthis/Dthat/Kaplan/Rigid-making operator/Stalnaker: (Kaplan 1978)(1): "dthis" and "dthat" always refer the object back to the actual world (i.e. they make it rigid). The reference is then in each possible world the original from the real world. >Dthat/Kaplan. I 198 E.g. Julius/Zipper/Evans/Stalnaker: the zipper example can be interpreted in two ways. a) As an abbreviation of a complex singular term dthis [the inventor of the zipper], then the inventor of the zipper is part of the meaning. And it is a logical truth that he invented it. b) As a definition: that Julius is the name of a person. Then it would be a semantic one ((s) not a logical connection) between the name and person. Then the role of the description, the reference, would have to be defined, e.g. someone overhears the name: case a) then this person does not understand the statement. Then dthis [the person to whom Stalnaker referred on the occasion]. Ad b) if the semantic properties of Julius are part of the historical causal chain, the competent speaker does not need to know anything about it. >Semantic properties. 1. Kaplan, David. 1978. Dthat. In Peter Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics. Academic Press. pp. 221--243_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18