Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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II 154
Make rigid/description/Kripke/Cresswell: (Kripke 1977, 259f): normal description/logical form/Cresswell: "The F is G" is true in every possible world w iff the thing (unambiguous) which is F in w, is also G in W . - Rigid description/logical form: here, that is true in w iff the thing that is in the actual world F, is w in G, no matter if it is there F in w or not. - Which world is the actual one, is relative to the respective possible world - solution: double indexing: two possible worlds: "The F is G" is true in w2 seen from w1, iff the thing that is F is in w1 G w2 -> two-dimensional semantics - make rigid: Makes that a sentence like "The F is G" can also stand alone. - Instead: truth conditions/Cresswell: if one sees the principle advantage of truth conditions over truth values in that, that the truth conditions provide the right input conditions for further embedding, then the make rigid is not so important.
II 155
Rigid/non-rigid/belief/modal logic/Cresswell: In contrast to modal contexts, the description is interpreted as non-rigid in belief contexts. - Modal Context: rigid.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-27