Dictionary of Arguments

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Strength of theories, philosophy: theories and systems can be compared in terms of their strength. With increasing expressiveness of a system, e.g. the possibility that statements refer to themselves, however, grows the risk of paradoxes. Strength and expressiveness do not always go hand in hand. Thus, e.g. the modal logical system S5, which is stronger than the system S4, is unable to establish a unique temporal order. Aspects of strength and weakness are inter alia the set of derivable sentences, or the size of the subject area of a theory or system. See also theories, systems, modal logic, axioms, axiom systems, expansion, mitigation, areas.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
III 77
Logical Necessity: strongest - physical necessity: weaker because of contingency - still weaker: general quantification (mere uniformity). - N.B.: from a law we cannot conclude general quantification. - Law: physical necessity.
III 108
High/low/stronger/weaker/Armstrong: E.g. "N (F, G)" is logically stronger than "All Fs are Gs". The universal statement (general quantification, mere conjunction) is logically weaker than a law statement.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-17
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