Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Speech Act Theory: Speech act theories are theories that place the focus of their reflections on what speakers effect with utterances rather than on the representation function of expressions and sentences. Different types of speech acts are distinguished depending on whether they are factual determinations, questions, commands, as well as aspects of these acts that go beyond a situation such as baptism or oath. See also actions, utterances, meanings, speaker meaning, representation.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
II 25
Sincerity condition: internal to the speech acts.
IV 251
Speech act/Searle: rule-determined actions - has always constitutive (not regulatory) rules - Searle: speech act: is key to the meaning - VsSearle: controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have fundamentally different nature than for actions.
V 68
Speech act is unequal game. - Explanation must presuppose rules - rules are not equal
Convention: speaking rule-governed behavior - rules, not behavior is crucial.
V 207
Traditional speech act theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: word W is needed to perform speech act A - then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something - SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones - does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same - it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts.
V 213
Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words. ( "fallacy of assertiveness")
IV 27
Speech act theory/SearleVsAustin: accepts verbs for acts - but one has to differentiate this - E.g. announcement of a command is not the command.
IV 78
Speech act theory/Searle: differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon - (E.g. linguistics: structural rules).
VI 86
The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence.
IV 86
Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act - in literature, no other act than in newspaper - no semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional.
IV 204
Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics.
VII 99
Speech act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied.
VIII 435
Speech act/Searle: is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker - VsChomsky: does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

> Counter arguments against Searle
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-25