Dictionary of Arguments

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Language rules, philosophy: the question here is whether rules for the use of language are possible or useful at all. Some authors acknowledge them for the definition of reference (reference objects), but not for meanings. See also language acquisition, language, language games, reference. meaning.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Wolf II 245
Language rules/QuineVs: are only factual practices (naturalistic conception).
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Quine VII (b) 32
Semantic rules/Quine: (language rules): analyticity: E.g. I do not know if "everything green is expanded" is analytical or not - purported relation between expressions and languages: A statement S is "analytical in terms of the language L" - Problem: making this useful for various statements and languages ​​- problem: Carnap’s rules contain the word "analytic" - solution: predicate "analytical in L0"? - Problem: what distinguishes it from the other predicates? - If we explain that, only for L0 and not in general.
VII (b) 35
Language rules/Quine: a semantic rule cannot be introduced ad hoc to explain analyticity - there must be a large number of language rules in order to explain each as an element of the set - otherwise circular, because only explicable in terms of analyticity (the explanation purpose) - E.g. postulate: who can say what true statements have the rank of postulates if there is only one single postulate, and not a set, in terms of which a postulate may be an element or not - relative terms need to be explained with respect to something - not ad hoc! - If LR is a simple list of true statements, then term "LR" remains unexplained instead of the unexplained "analytical" - "language rule" is not an intrinsic property - LR should be relative to truth condition of a language - problem: there is no distinction of a subclass that would intrinsically be more an LR - Important argument: if "true regarding LR": then not truth analytical in contrast to another.
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Lauener XI 134
Language rules/Lauener: always need intentions, are not extensional.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-21
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