Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Language rules, philosophy: the question here is whether rules for the use of language are possible or useful at all. Some authors acknowledge them for the definition of reference (reference objects), but not for meanings. See also language acquisition, language, language games, reference. meaning.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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Wolf II 245
Language rules/QuineVs: are only factual practices (naturalistic conception).
Quine VII 32
Semantic rules/Quine: (language rules): analyticity: E.g. I do not know if "everything green is expanded" is analytical or not - purported relation between expressions and languages: A statement S is "analytical in terms of the language L" - Problem: making this useful for various statements and languages ​​- problem: Carnap’s rules contain the word "analytic" - solution: predicate "analytical in L0"? - Problem: what distinguishes it from the other predicates? - If we explain that, only for L0 and not in general.
VII 35
Language rules/Quine: a semantic rule cannot be introduced ad hoc to explain analyticity - there must be a large number of language rules in order to explain each as an element of the set - otherwise circular, because only explicable in terms of analyticity (the explanation purpose) - E.g. postulate: who can say what true statements have the rank of postulates if there is only one single postulate, and not a set, in terms of which a postulate may be an element or not - relative terms need to be explained with respect to something - not ad hoc! - If LR is a simple list of true statements, then term "LR" remains unexplained instead of the unexplained "analytical" - "language rule" is not an intrinsic property - LR should be relative to truth condition of a language - problem: there is no distinction of a subclass that would intrinsically be more an LR - Important argument: if "true regarding LR": then not truth analytical in contrast to another.
Lauener XI 134
Language rules/Lauener: always need intentions, are not extensional.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-05-21