|Language rules, philosophy: the question here is whether rules for the use of language are possible or useful at all. Some authors acknowledge them for the definition of reference (reference objects), but not for meanings. See also language acquisition, language, language games, reference. meaning._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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|Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986
Language rules / Carnap: a) what "square" is true of, is a square, b) what "rectangle" is true of, is a rectangle c) What are "square" is true of, is a rectangle - meaning postulates allow the step c) - Mention/use/Carnap: the expressions are not mentioned in the maning postulate, but only used - "(x) (Fx> Gx)" is a m.post. of S" is a statement about "F" and "G" in S - ChisholmVsCarnap: Tarski: on the left is a necessary condition for the truth of the expression on the right-hand side - that does not refer to language rules, but to non-linguistic entites - no sentence is true only due to the use._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004