Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Language, philosophy: language is a set of phonetic or written coded forms fixed at a time for the exchange of information or distinctions within a community whose members are able to recognize and interpret these forms as signs or symbols. In a wider sense, language is also a sign system, which can be processed by machines. See also communication, language rules, meaning, meaning change, information, signs, symbols, words, sentences, syntax, semantics, grammar, pragmatics, translation, interpretation, radical interpretation, indeterminacy.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
EMD II 166
Psychologizing of language/Peacocke: Problem: there may be an infinite number of types of situations that are specified psychologically, in which a given semantic predicate is applicable, and which have nothing in common, that is specifiable with psychological vocabulary. - (> Logical form) - ((s)question: can you identify these infinitely psychological predicates as psychologically?) - PeacockeVsVs: it is not about reduction - the fine given propositional adjustments must not be attributed before translation.
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II 168
Interpreted language/Peacocke: T-scheme T(s) ↔ p - plus performance relation 'sats' (uninterpreted itself) between rows of objects, and sentences.
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II 171
Variant: is an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional adjustments. - Then the listener takes the utterence as prima facie evidence. (> Prima facie).
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II 168
Language/Community/Peacocke: on the convention that the speaker only utters the sentence when he intends to (Schiffer ditto). - Problem: the attribution of the criterion presupposes already a theory by the speaker.
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II 175
Language/Community/Convention/Peacocke: Problem: 'common knowledge': E.g. assuming English *: as English, except that the truth conditions are changed for an easy conjunction: T (Susan is blond and Jane is small) ↔ Susan is blond - problem: if English is the actual language, would also E* be the actual language at the same time - because it could be common knowledge that each member that believes p & q therefore believes also p.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-21