Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||
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| Language, philosophy: language is a set of phonetic or written coded forms fixed at a time for the exchange of information or distinctions within a community whose members are able to recognize and interpret these forms as signs or symbols. In a wider sense, language is also a sign system, which can be processed by machines. See also communication, language rules, meaning, meaning change, information, signs, symbols, words, sentences, syntax, semantics, grammar, pragmatics, translation, interpretation, radical interpretation, indeterminacy._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Books on Amazon |
Avr I 75 Definition language/Lewis: assigns meaning to noise or sign strings - Possible language/Loar: abstract entity which must still be referred to the speaker. --- EMD II 158 Language/Lewis: all possible sentences known in sense diviso, not in sensu composito - ((s) It is not about not learning complete sentences from memory, but known components.) - the building blocks, not the finished structure. --- Lewis II 202 Language/Lewis: thesis: the Convention according to which L is used in the population P is a convention of truthfulness and trust in L. --- Schwarz I 70 Language/infinite/Lewis: if sentences are finite sign strings from a finite alphabet, there are no more than Aleph1 many sets of sentences, as many as there are real numbers. - But there are many more ways in which a world could have been - at least Aleph2. --- I 28ff Language: It is a popular exercise to reshape a language so that its non-logical vocabulary consists only of predicates. It is just as easy to reshape it in a way that its non-logical vocabulary consists only of names. (Assuming the logical vocabulary includes a copula). This name could be designated by individuals, quantities, properties, types, states, relationships, sizes, phenomena, etc. But they are still names. If we had that, we could replace all theoretical terms by variables of the same sort. --- I 33 ff If an individual usually deviates, it is no longer part of the usual observation language. --- II 228 f E.g. Assume a population of notorious liars who are often untrue. In this case, there would not even exist regularity. - LewisVs: I deny that L is used in this population. The normal use of language in this case is far from being determined. I deny that the entire population uses the language L, but it would be possible that every single liar uses L! Provided that he falsely believes himself to be a member of a population, in which a convention of truthfulness and trust in L exists. --- II 229 Irony/Ironist: these people are actually true in L. However, they are not true in the literal sense in L! That means that they are true in another language associated with L, which we can call "literally-L". Between L and "literally-L" there is this relation: a good way to describe L is to first determine literally-L and then to describe L itself as a lanugage that resulted from certain discrepancies. This two-step determination of L may be much simpler than any direct determination of L. --- II 240 There is only one philosophy of language. Language and languages are complementary._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. |
LW I D. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LW II D. Lewis Konventionen Berlin 1975 LW IV D. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 LW V D. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 LwCl I Cl. I. Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Ev I G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 LwCl I Cl. I. Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-26