Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
Avr I 75
Definition language/Lewis: assigns meaning to noise or sign strings - Possible language/Loar: abstract entity which must still be referred to the speaker.
EMD II 158
Language/Lewis: all possible sentences known in sense diviso, not in sensu composito - ((s) It is not about not learning complete sentences from memory, but known components.) - the building blocks, not the finished structure.
Lewis II 202
Language/Lewis: thesis: the Convention according to which L is used in the population P is a convention of truthfulness and trust in L.
Schwarz I 70
Language/infinite/Lewis: if sentences are finite sign strings from a finite alphabet, there are no more than Aleph1 many sets of sentences, as many as there are real numbers. - But there are many more ways in which a world could have been - at least Aleph2.
I 28ff
Language: It is a popular exercise to reshape a language so that its non-logical vocabulary consists only of predicates. It is just as easy to reshape it in a way that its non-logical vocabulary consists only of names. (Assuming the logical vocabulary includes a copula).
This name could be designated by individuals, quantities, properties, types, states, relationships, sizes, phenomena, etc. But they are still names. If we had that, we could replace all theoretical terms by variables of the same sort.
I 33 ff
If an individual usually deviates, it is no longer part of the usual observation language.
II 228 f
E.g. Assume a population of notorious liars who are often untrue. In this case, there would not even exist regularity. - LewisVs: I deny that L is used in this population.
The normal use of language in this case is far from being determined. I deny that the entire population uses the language L, but it would be possible that every single liar uses L! Provided that he falsely believes himself to be a member of a population, in which a convention of truthfulness and trust in L exists.
II 229
Irony/Ironist: these people are actually true in L. However, they are not true in the literal sense in L! That means that they are true in another language associated with L, which we can call "literally-L".
Between L and "literally-L" there is this relation: a good way to describe L is to first determine literally-L and then to describe L itself as a lanugage that resulted from certain discrepancies. This two-step determination of L may be much simpler than any direct determination of L.
II 240
There is only one philosophy of language. Language and languages ​​are complementary.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Language

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26