Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Rorty II 130f
Positivists/Rorty: Replace "experience", "ideas", "consciousness" by the concept "language" - then primary qualities are no longer more closely related to reality than secondary ones (VsLocke) - but it was this precise thesis that was resurrected by Kripke’s revolution against Wittgenstein (KripkeVslinguistic turn).
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EMD II 335
Language/Davidson: "Davidson’s criterion": a language must not have an infinite number of basic concepts - Kripke: otherwise it cannot be the "first language".
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EMD II 338
KripkeVsDavidson: We just have to demand that only a finite number of axioms includes "new" vocabulary (weaker).
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EMD II 397
Language/Infinite/Kripke: If the domain D is countable, the infinite sequences which can be formed from its objects are non-countable and therefore cannot be mapped on to D one-to-one. They can therefore ((s) in the meta language) not even be coded and therefore not be reduced. - ...Even then there may be nothing in the vocabulary of the meta language that is sufficient.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Language



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29