Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Language, philosophy: language is a set of phonetic or written coded forms fixed at a time for the exchange of information or distinctions within a community whose members are able to recognize and interpret these forms as signs or symbols. In a wider sense, language is also a sign system, which can be processed by machines. See also communication, language rules, meaning, meaning change, information, signs, symbols, words, sentences, syntax, semantics, grammar, pragmatics, translation, interpretation, radical interpretation, indeterminacy.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
I 113
Language/Davidson: Conventions and rules do not explain language, language explains them.
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II 54
Thesis: the term of language is superfluous. There is no such thing as a language, at least not in the sense that many philosophers and linguists claim.
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Rorty II 21
Davidson/Rorty: "How language works" has little to do with the question "how knowledge works."
DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language no instrumental character system, neither of expression nor representation.
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Rorty II 21
Davidson: There is no such thing as a language, there is nothing you can learn or master. (Rather provisional theories). No conventions, how we communicate!
Davidson: we should come to worship no one at all, everything, our language, consciousness, community, are products of time and chance.
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Brandom I 922
Language/Davidson: merely practical, hypothetical necessity, comfortable for community to have it - decisive: how someone would like to be understood - not to make up content before mutual interpretations.
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Brandom I 518
Language Davidson: interprets linguistic expressions as an aspect of the intentional interpretation of actions - pro top down - Tarski: whether top-down or bottom-up.
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K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 51
Language/Davidson: each is accessible through the causal relationships - ultimately irrelevant for the truth-theory, which is the actual spoken language.
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Brandom I 454
Language/Davidson/Rorty: not conceptual schema, but causal interaction with the environment - described by the radical interpretation. Then one can no longer ask whether the language "fits" into the world.
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Rorty III 33
Language/DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language is not medium, neither of expression nor of representation. - Wrong questions: e.g. "What place have values?" - E.g. "Are colors more conscious dependent than weights?". - Correct: "Does our use of these words stand in the way of our use of other words?"
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Rorty VI 133
Language/Davidson/Rorty: There is no such thing as a language. (> Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs"): there is no set of conventions that one would have to learn when one learns to speak. No abstract structure that must be internalized.
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Seel III 28
Language/Davidson: Thesis: Language is not a medium - but mind without world and world without mind are empty concepts. - Language does not stand between us and the world - seeing: we do not see through the eyes but with them - VsMentalese: does not exist. - Language is part of us. - It is an organ of us. - It is the way we have the world. - Medium/Davidson/Seel: here use is very narrow. - Medium/Gadamer: not an instrument, but an indispensable element of thought.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Se I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Se II
M. Seel
Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000

Se III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001


> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Language



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-18