|Language, philosophy: language is a set of phonetic or written coded forms fixed at a time for the exchange of information or distinctions within a community whose members are able to recognize and interpret these forms as signs or symbols. In a wider sense, language is also a sign system, which can be processed by machines. See also communication, language rules, meaning, meaning change, information, signs, symbols, words, sentences, syntax, semantics, grammar, pragmatics, translation, interpretation, radical interpretation, indeterminacy._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Language/Davidson: Conventions and rules do not explain language, language explains them.
Thesis: the term of language is superfluous. There is no such thing as a language, at least not in the sense that many philosophers and linguists claim.
Rorty II 21
Davidson/Rorty: "How language works" has little to do with the question "how knowledge works."
DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language no instrumental character system, neither of expression nor representation.
Rorty II 21
Davidson: There is no such thing as a language, there is nothing you can learn or master. (Rather provisional theories). No conventions, how we communicate!
Davidson: we should come to worship no one at all, everything, our language, consciousness, community, are products of time and chance.
Brandom I 922
Language/Davidson: merely practical, hypothetical necessity, comfortable for community to have it - decisive: how someone would like to be understood - not to make up content before mutual interpretations.
Brandom I 518
Language Davidson: interprets linguistic expressions as an aspect of the intentional interpretation of actions - pro top down - Tarski: whether top-down or bottom-up.
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Language/Davidson: each is accessible through the causal relationships - ultimately irrelevant for the truth-theory, which is the actual spoken language.
Brandom I 454
Language/Davidson/Rorty: not conceptual schema, but causal interaction with the environment - described by the radical interpretation. Then one can no longer ask whether the language "fits" into the world.
Rorty III 33
Language/DavidsonVsTradition/Rorty: Language is not medium, neither of expression nor of representation. - Wrong questions: e.g. "What place have values?" - E.g. "Are colors more conscious dependent than weights?". - Correct: "Does our use of these words stand in the way of our use of other words?"
Rorty VI 133
Language/Davidson/Rorty: There is no such thing as a language. (> Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs"): there is no set of conventions that one would have to learn when one learns to speak. No abstract structure that must be internalized.
Seel III 28
Language/Davidson: Thesis: Language is not a medium - but mind without world and world without mind are empty concepts. - Language does not stand between us and the world - seeing: we do not see through the eyes but with them - VsMentalese: does not exist. - Language is part of us. - It is an organ of us. - It is the way we have the world. - Medium/Davidson/Seel: here use is very narrow. - Medium/Gadamer: not an instrument, but an indispensable element of thought._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997
Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001