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|I 279 (where?)
Language/Chomsky: apart from its mental representation, it has no objective existence. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish here between "systems of beliefs" and "knowledge".
Language/ChomskyVsQuine: must separate language and theory - otherwise, two speakers of the same language could have no disagreement.
Language/Chomsky/Quine: no frame of a tentative theory as in physics - several analytical hypotheses not only possible but necessary - ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the concepts of the language can be explained with physical dimensions - Aristotle: rather associated with actions - VsQuine: not evident that similarities can be localized in a room - principles, not "learned sentences".
VsQuine: cannot be dependent on "disposition for reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be essential.
Perhaps language does not have to be taught.
Graeser I 121f
Language/ChomskyVsGrice: Question: should the main aspect really be communication? - Searle: rather representation, but not as opposite - Meaning/VsGrice: most of the sentences of a language have never been uttered, so anyone can hardly ever have meant something by them - Meaning/VsGrice: We can only ever find out speaker meanings, because we know what the sentence means. - Students of Grice: Strawson and Searle.
Münch III 320
Language/Chomsky/Holenstein: no natural kind.
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002