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|Nagel I 53
Wittgenstein, Solipsism: The truth of solipsism cannot be uttered, but is still shown in the fact that the world is always described in my language. In this language I cannot truly say that the world is my world, because that is wrong in my language.
Nagel: but all this is said in my language, and this shows that the world is my world in a deeper sense, although exactly this cannot be said.
Hintikka I 96ff
World/Tractatus/Solipsism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: question whether Wittgenstein's world is not irretrievably egocentric. Finally, the sense data means my sense data.
Saying/Showing/Wittgenstein: 5,562 (entirety of all objects, limit of the world).. "question to what extent solipsism is a truth, what solipsism namely means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself."
Hintikka: if we interpret the objects of the Tractatus as objects of my acquaintance, then Wittgenstein's cautious solipsism gets not only understandable but almost predictable.
Solipsism/Tractatus/Hintikka: is not metaphysical here, he does not depend on that the objects are assigned to any specific subjective awareness-dependent status. It is about their phenomenal condition, so that I can refer them to my language.
Nevertheless, what he considers as solipsism, has a specific content.
Realism/solipsism/Hintikka: however, the realism is right in its assertion that this "reduction to the acquaintance" has no impact in terms of the metaphysical reality of the rest of the world.
World/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: The relationship with me is not essential to the objects. "the ordinary way of speech could make a ((s) false) appearance as if the relationship with the owner of the hand would be something that is in the nature of the hand itself." ..therefore it might be useful, to give a hand a name during repeated use. (Philosophical Remarks VII. 71, 99f).
Appearance/appear/seem/Wittgenstein: "It appears to appear" cannot be said. Solipsism and behaviorism are opposed to each other.
WittgensteinVsSolipsism: if it is logically impossible that someone else has a toothache, then it is just as impossible for me.
Solipsism/Wittgenstein: does not want a notation, in which the ego has a monopoly, but one in which the ego disappears.
Temporal solipsism/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell E.g. the world was created five minutes ago. - This is not meaningless because there is a criterion - similar like in measurements. - E.g. "Every time there is no white rabbit sitting there."
"Only the present is real": Problem: this pretends to give a picture that is in contrast with another picture. - But that does not succeed.
Solipsism/Wittgenstein/Schulte: to put my solipsistic position into words, I would have to be able to reach beyond both boundaries, of the world and the language - "My" is not opposed to "that". - Here we see that solipsism coincides with pure realism.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996