Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Rorty VI 225
PragmatismVsSkepticism: (rough version): "We do not need to respond to skepticism at all; it makes no difference whether we respond to it or not". (WilliamsVs).
Horwich I 447
Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty/Leeds: PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have a common error, "correspondence" a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of the world that must be ontologically homogeneous - (OH: e.g. only relations between representations, not between rep and objects ((s)> Berkeley) Peirce: this homogeneity does not need to exist - PlantingaVsPeirce: it does if the objects can only exist, for example, by showing their structure -" RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation - RortyVsPeirce: "ideal" unclear.
I 448
Solution/James: "true of" is not an analyzable relation - therefore correspondence is dropped - solution/Dewey: It’s just an attempt to interpose language as an intermediary instance, which would make the problem appear interesting.
Rorty I 129
Skepticism/Tradition/RortyVsDescartes: not whether others are in pain is interesting - skepticism would never have become interesting, if the concept of "naturally given" had not arisen.
VI 223ff
Skepticism: main representative: Stroud: serious ongoing problem - Michael WilliamsVsStroud: arises only from absurd totality demand: that everything must be explained together - statements only make sense in a situation.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29