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|Rorty VI 225
PragmatismVsSkepticism: (rough version): "We do not need to respond to skepticism at all; it makes no difference whether we respond to it or not". (WilliamsVs).
Horwich I 447
Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty/Leeds: PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have a common error, "correspondence" a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of the world that must be ontologically homogeneous - (OH: e.g. only relations between representations, not between rep and objects ((s)> Berkeley) Peirce: this homogeneity does not need to exist - PlantingaVsPeirce: it does if the objects can only exist, for example, by showing their structure -" RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation - RortyVsPeirce: "ideal" unclear.
Solution/James: "true of" is not an analyzable relation - therefore correspondence is dropped - solution/Dewey: It’s just an attempt to interpose language as an intermediary instance, which would make the problem appear interesting.
Rorty I 129
Skepticism/Tradition/RortyVsDescartes: not whether others are in pain is interesting - skepticism would never have become interesting, if the concept of "naturally given" had not arisen.
Skepticism: main representative: Stroud: serious ongoing problem - Michael WilliamsVsStroud: arises only from absurd totality demand: that everything must be explained together - statements only make sense in a situation.
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994