Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Skepticism: is an expression for the more or less well-formulated view that perceptual subjects cannot in principle have any security with regard to their knowledge about the external world. The doubts about the reliability of the sensory organs can be extended to doubts about the existence of an external world, if the possibility of a fundamental deception, for example by a permanent dream, is accepted. See also verification, evidence, perception, certainty, Moore's hands, solipsism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

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II 168
Skepticism/Nozick: depends on that we acquire our knowledge indirectly.
II 198
Skepticism/Nozick: common form: claiming that someone could believe something even though it is wrong.
II 199
Punchline: the truth of
Condition (3) "If p would be false, S would not believe it"
is compatible with the fact that a person believes p, although p is false. - Justification: condition (3) is not an entailment (Nozick: = formal implication).
Condition (3) does not mean that in all situations, where not-p is applied, S does not believe that p. - Condition (3) can be true even if there is a possible situation where non-p and S believes that p. - Condition (3) speaks of the situation in which p is false. - Not every situation where p is false, is the situation that would prevail if p is wrong. - Possible World: condition (3) speaks of the next ~ p-world to our actual world. - It speaks of the not-p-neighborhood - E.g. Dream, E.g. demon E.g. brains in the tank - but only if p is false: - So only in the next non-p-worlds. - Even if we were in the tank, condition (3) could not apply.
II 204
Punchline: I do not know that I am not in the tank - but I know that I write this. Because for this we have a connection, a trace.
II 209
Skepticism/NozickVsSkepticism: The skepticism is right that we have no connection to some facts, but it is wrong, that we could not connect to many other facts - including those that imply that we are not brains in a vat, so facts which we believe but do not know.
II 242f
Skepticism/NozickVsSkepticism/(s): Conclusion: 1. I know that skepticism is wrong - 2. If the skepticism were true, I would not believe that I know much. 3. Because the assertion of skepticism that I do not know much, does not consist in the possibility of confusion with an illusory world, but simply in a world where you do not know much - 4. That I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, is an isolated special case - 5. Even if I knew very little, I would still know that I am sitting on a chair - 6. Even if that would be wrong, it would not follow that I am a brain a vat.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-22