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Skepticism/Nozick: depends on that we acquire our knowledge indirectly.
Skepticism/Nozick: common form: claiming that someone could believe something even though it is wrong.
Punchline: the truth of
Condition (3) "If p would be false, S would not believe it"
is compatible with the fact that a person believes p, although p is false. - Justification: condition (3) is not an entailment (Nozick: = formal implication).
Condition (3) does not mean that in all situations, where not-p is applied, S does not believe that p. - Condition (3) can be true even if there is a possible situation where non-p and S believes that p. - Condition (3) speaks of the situation in which p is false. - Not every situation where p is false, is the situation that would prevail if p is wrong. - Possible World: condition (3) speaks of the next ~ p-world to our actual world. - It speaks of the not-p-neighborhood - E.g. Dream, E.g. demon E.g. brains in the tank - but only if p is false: - So only in the next non-p-worlds. - Even if we were in the tank, condition (3) could not apply.
Punchline: I do not know that I am not in the tank - but I know that I write this. Because for this we have a connection, a trace.
Skepticism/NozickVsSkepticism: The skepticism is right that we have no connection to some facts, but it is wrong, that we could not connect to many other facts - including those that imply that we are not brains in a vat, so facts which we believe but do not know.
Skepticism/NozickVsSkepticism/(s): Conclusion: 1. I know that skepticism is wrong - 2. If the skepticism were true, I would not believe that I know much. 3. Because the assertion of skepticism that I do not know much, does not consist in the possibility of confusion with an illusory world, but simply in a world where you do not know much - 4. That I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, is an isolated special case - 5. Even if I knew very little, I would still know that I am sitting on a chair - 6. Even if that would be wrong, it would not follow that I am a brain a vat.
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981
The Nature of Rationality 1994