Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 67
Skepticism/Davidson: As a minimum assumption one can assume that we are at least right with regard to our own person. Such a realization, however, is logically independent of what we believe about the world outside. So it cannot provide a foundation for the science and beliefs of the healthy human understanding.
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Rorty VI 166
Skepticism: the skeptic says: from the fact that we must think of the world in a certain way does not follow that it is indeed so. He encounters all claims with the question "How do you know that?"
DavidsonVsSkepticism: that can be pathologized and omitted (like FregeVsSkepticism): the skeptic is not curable, because even in his next utterance he cannot assume that his words still mean the same as before.
Skeptics: Why should not necessary assumptions be objectively wrong? It is common to all skeptical arguments that the skeptic understands the truth as a relation of correspondence between the world and belief, knowing that this can never be verified.
DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: The "problem of the outside world" and the "other minds" rests on a false distinction between the "phenomenological content of experience" (tradition) and the intentional states that one attributes to a person on the basis of their causal interactions with the environment.
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Dav I 53/4
"Everything different"/Skepticism/Stroud: it could be that everything is different than we imagine it - Quine: that would be a distinction without differentiation: since the observation sentences are holophrastically conditioned for stimuli, the relationships to the evidence remain unchanged - Preserve the structure and you will preserve everything. ((s) Then yesterday everything was already different.)
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I 94
Causal theory of meaning/VsDescartes: in basic cases, words act necessarily from the kinds of objects causing them. Then there is no room for Cartesian doubt.
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I 95
DavidsonVsSkepticism: cannot be formulated because the senses do not play a role in the explanation of believing, meaning (to mean) and knowledge - as far as the content of the causal relations of the causal relations between the propositional attitudes and the world is independent. Of course, senses play a causal role in knowledge and language learning.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Skepticism



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25