Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Skepticism: is an expression for the more or less well-formulated view that perceptual subjects cannot in principle have any security with regard to their knowledge about the external world. The doubts about the reliability of the sensory organs can be extended to doubts about the existence of an external world, if the possibility of a fundamental deception, for example by a permanent dream, is accepted. See also verification, evidence, perception, certainty, Moore's hands, solipsism.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
I 67
Skepticism/Davidson: As a minimum assumption one can assume that we are at least right with regard to our own person. Such a realization, however, is logically independent of what we believe about the world outside. So it cannot provide a foundation for the science and beliefs of the healthy human understanding.
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Rorty VI 166
Skepticism: the skeptic says: from the fact that we must think of the world in a certain way does not follow that it is indeed so. He encounters all claims with the question "How do you know that?"
DavidsonVsSkepticism: that can be pathologized and omitted (like FregeVsSkepticism): the skeptic is not curable, because even in his next utterance he cannot assume that his words still mean the same as before.
Skeptics: Why should not necessary assumptions be objectively wrong? It is common to all skeptical arguments that the skeptic understands the truth as a relation of correspondence between the world and belief, knowing that this can never be verified.
DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: The "problem of the outside world" and the "other minds" rests on a false distinction between the "phenomenological content of experience" (tradition) and the intentional states that one attributes to a person on the basis of their causal interactions with the environment.
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Dav I 53/4
"Everything different"/Skepticism/Stroud: it could be that everything is different than we imagine it - Quine: that would be a distinction without differentiation: since the observation sentences are holophrastically conditioned for stimuli, the relationships to the evidence remain unchanged - Preserve the structure and you will preserve everything. ((s) Then yesterday everything was already different.)
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I 94
Causal theory of meaning/VsDescartes: in basic cases, words act necessarily from the kinds of objects causing them. Then there is no room for Cartesian doubt.
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I 95
DavidsonVsSkepticism: cannot be formulated because the senses do not play a role in the explanation of believing, meaning (to mean) and knowledge - as far as the content of the causal relations of the causal relations between the propositional attitudes and the world is independent. Of course, senses play a causal role in knowledge and language learning.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Skepticism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-25